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AND  SOCIAL LEARNING* 
GLENN  ELLISON  AND  DREW  FUDENBERG 
This paper studies  the way that word-of-mouth  communication  aggregates  the 
information  of individual  agents.  We find that  the  structure  of the communication 
process  determines  whether  all agents  end up making  identical  choices,  with  less 
communication  making  this  conformity  more  likely.  Despite  the  players'  naive 
decision rules and the stochastic  decision environment,  word-of-mouth  communica- 
tion  may  lead  all  players  to  adopt  the  action  that  is  on  average  superior.  These 
socially efficient outcomes  tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic  agents  must  often make decisions  without  knowing 
the costs  and benefits  of the possible  choices.  Given the frequency 
with  which  such  situations  arise, it is understandable  that  agents 
often  choose  not  to  perform  studies  or experiments,  but  instead 
rely  on  whatever  information  they  have  obtained  via  casual 
word-of-mouth  communication.  Reliance  on  this  sort  of  easily 
obtained  information  appears  to  be  common  in  circumstances 
ranging  from consumers  choosing  restaurants  or auto  mechanics 
to  business  managers  evaluating  alternative  organizational 
structures. 
This  paper studies  two  related  environments  in arguing  that 
individuals'  reliance  on word-of-mouth  communication  has  inter- 
esting  implications  for their  aggregate  behavior.  First,  motivated 
by the diffusion  of new technologies,  we consider a choice between 
two  competing  products  with  unequal  qualities  or  payoffs,  and 
show that the structure of communication  is important in determin- 
ing whether  the population  as a whole  is likely to learn to use the 
superior  product.  Second,  we  consider  a  choice  between  two 
products  or  practices  that  are  equally  good,  and  ask  whether 
consumers  are  likely  to  "herd"  onto  a single  choice,  or whether 
"diversity" will obtain even in the long run. 
We explore the implications  of word-of-mouth  communication 
in a simple nonstrategic  environment.  There is a large population 
of identical  players, each of whom repeatedly  chooses  between  two 
possible  actions.  Each  player's  payoff  is  determined  by  his  own 
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actions  and  some  stochastic  shocks,  but  is  not  influenced  by the 
actions  chosen  by  others,  so  there  are  no  direct  or  "strategic" 
reasons  that  the  player's  choice  should  depend  on the  choices  of 
others.  The only reason the players' actions are linked is because of 
the way that  information  is transmitted.  To model the  difficulties 
that  might  arise when  choosing  between  technologies  or methods 
of organization,  we assume  that  payoffs can only be learned  from 
experience.  Further,  payoffs  in  each  period  are  subject  to  both 
common  shocks  (e.g.,  weather,  business  conditions,  time-varying 
quality) and idiosyncratic  ones. Because of the idiosyncratic  compo- 
nent  it seems  sensible  that  players would want  to collect informa- 
tion from others. 
In  this  environment  we  examine  the  implications  of  exoge- 
nously  specified  rules  for  behavior.  This  involves  two  separate 
departures  from rationality.  First,  motivated  by the  idea that  the 
decision problem at hand is but one of many informed by the same 
set  of  casual  conversations,  we  do  not  model  the  acquisition  of 
information  as  an  optimal  search  problem.  Instead,  we  simply 
assume  that  in  each  period  each  player  hears  of  the  current 
experiences  of a random  sample  of N other players  and treat N as 
an exogenous  parameter  describing possible  communication  struc- 
tures.  Second,  we  specify  a simple  model  for boundedly  rational 
choice  given  the  information  players  acquire.  The  population 
displays inertia, with a fraction of the players ignoring the informa- 
tion  they  receive  in  a given  period  (or not  inquiring  at  all)  and 
continuing  with their previous choice. The players who do consider 
switching  pick the action that  appears to give the highest  average 
payoff given their most recent experience and the reports they have 
heard in the current  period. Moreover, we impose  the  "must-see" 
restriction  that  players  who  only  obtain  reports  about  the  choice 
they  are currently  using  do not contemplate  switching,  even if all 
observed payoffs to their current choice are low.' 
These  naive  rules  are  intended  to  capture  the  essence  of 
word-of-mouth  communication.  Some  economic  agents  are prob- 
ably more  sophisticated  than  this,  and it would  be interesting  to 
explore the implications  of more sophisticated,  but still boundedly 
rational  behavior  rules.  However,  given  the  complexity  of  the 
1.  We feel that  this  assumption  is plausible  on behavioral  grounds.  It can also 
be derived as the outcome  of rational  Bayesian  learning  in the neighborhood  of the 
efficient  state,  as in the  closely  related  model  of Banerjee  and Fudenberg  [1994]. 
Banerjee  [1993]  offers  a  different  explanation  for  the  must-see  property  by 
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decision  problems,  we find the  extreme  simplicity  of the behavior 
we study at least  as plausible  as the complex behavior  required by 
the  standard  "fully rational"  approach, which  requires  players to 
update optimally from a consistent  and common prior distribution 
over the possible  structures  of payoffs and noise processes. 
Our most basic conclusion  is that the structure  of the word-of- 
mouth  process  affects  the  tendency  of  a  population  to  display 
conformity  or diversity,  with  less  communication  (that  is, smaller 
but nonzero  samples  for each individual)  making conformity  more 
likely. Despite the players' naive behavior and the complex stochas- 
tic environment  of our model, we find that word-of-mouth  commu- 
nication  may  allow  efficient  social  learning  in  the  sense  that  all 
players  eventually  adopt the  action  which  is on average  superior. 
Surprisingly,  these  socially  efficient  outcomes  tend  to  occur  only 
when each individual receives very little information. 
At  first  sight  it  may  be  surprising  that,  in  contrast  to  our 
previous paper on boundedly  rational learning  [Ellison and Fuden- 
berg  1993],  social  learning  in  this  model  can  lead  to  long-run 
efficiency  in  the  absence  of  explicit  popularity  weighting.  The 
explanation  is that  the must-see  restriction  incorporates  a form of 
popularity  weighting,  as  it  implies  that  players  tend  not  to  hear 
about  unpopular  technologies,  and hence  allows  these  to die out. 
Previous  models  of  word-of-mouth  communication  include  the 
contagion model, Smallwood and Conlisk's  [1979] model of replace- 
ment  on breakdown,  Satterthwaite's  [1979]  model  of reputation 
goods,  and  Kirman's  [1993]  model  of search  by ants.  Our model 
differs from these  papers both in the structure  of the environment 
in which people learn and the form of the players' behavioral rules. 
Typically,  previous  work  has  assumed  that  the  aggregate  perfor- 
mance  of each  choice  is  fixed  over  time  and  that  players  always 
adopt  whichever  choice  they  hear  about  regardless  of  how  its 
performance  compares  with  their  own  experience.  In  these  re- 
spects, our model is closer to that of our [1993] paper, although  the 
environment  is more complex  due to the  addition  of idiosyncratic 
noise.  Indeed, the simplest  unweighted  single  population  model of 
Ellison and Fudenberg may be thought  of as the limiting  case of the 
model  presented  here  as  the  sample  size  N  becomes  infinite: 
word-of-mouth  sampling with an infinite  sample allows each player 
to average out the  idiosyncratic  shocks,  but  not the  common  one, 
and so in the  limit  the  players  all choose  the  technology  that  had 
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In addition to the differences  in the decision environment  and 
decision rules, our analysis  is also somewhat  different from most of 
the  previous  literature  in  its  focus  on  a  categorization  of  the 
dynamic pattern  of the market  shares of the two choices. We begin 
with  the  case  where  the  average  payoffs  are  identical.  Here  we 
distinguish  two possibilities.  If all consumers  eventually  make the 
same choice (formally, if the market  share of one choice converges 
to  one),  we  say  that  the  population  exhibits  "conformity."  If 
instead  the market shares perpetually  fluctuate  or settle  down to a 
nontrivial  split, we say that  the population  exhibits  diversity.  Our 
main  conclusion,  presented  in  Section  IV,  is  that  sufficiently 
limited word-of-mouth  communication  results in conformity. When 
players receive more information,  i.e., when N is large, the system 
exhibits  diversity. 
In  the  case  where  the  choices  have  unequal  payoffs,  we 
distinguish  three possible patterns  of behavior. First, as before, the 
population  may  exhibit  diversity.  Second,  we  may  have  efficient 
social learning with everyone  adopting the superior choice. Finally, 
there  is  "inefficient  herding"  if  everyone  eventually  adopts  the 
same choice but the common choice is not necessarily  optimal. 
To  understand  how  these  regions  arise,  it  is  instructive  to 
think  of the  superior  average payoff as a force pushing  all players 
toward  using  the  better  choice.  The  long-run  behavior  of  the 
system  is  then  determined  by how  this  force  combines  with  the 
word-of-mouth  process's  "inherent"  favoring  of  conformity  or 
diversity.  When  the  sample  size N  is large,  we show  in Section  V 
that  the  diversity  forces  are  overwhelming,  and  the  first  case 
obtains.  When N  is smaller,  there  is efficient  social learning,  as a 
not  too  strong  tendency  toward  diversity  and the  superior  payoff 
combine  to  prevent  convergence  to  the  inferior  extreme  while 
allowing convergence  to the superior extreme.  For some parameter 
values,  very  small  N  produces  inefficient  herding.  We find,  how- 
ever, that  this behavior  is rare when  significant  inertia  is present, 
as it may be that  even N  =  1 is large enough  to produce efficient 
learning. 
To assess  the  robustness  of our conclusions,  we examine  two 
related  models  in Section  VI. In the  first variant,  players  practice 
popularity  weighting,  combining  information  about  payoffs  that 
they  obtain  from  their  samples  with  information  about  overall 
market  shares.  We find that  the  same  basic  patterns  of behavior 
occur, although  efficient  social learning  may now require that  the 
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common  shock  to  the  system  changes  more  frequently  than  any 
individual player observes  the system,  so that when information  is 
obtained about someone's  most recent experience  it may reflect the 
payoffs  of a previous  date.  In  this  way,  we  think  of the  players' 
sampling  process  as taking  advantage  of a social  memory  of past 
payoffs. This  might  be expected  to give a clearer advantage  to the 
product  which  is  better  on  average,  and  possibly  make  larger 
samples  more  efficient.  In  examining  the  extreme  cases  of  two 
period and infinite  memories,  we find that  sampling  only one other 
player  is  still  efficient,  but  note  that  learning  may  be  nearly 
efficient with large sample sizes as well. 
II. THE MODEL 
We examine  word-of-mouth  communication  and social learn- 
ing in the  context  of a population  of agents  who  are faced with  a 
choice between  two competing  products,  technologies,  or practices, 
which  we label f and g.  There  is a continuum  of identical  agents, 
and  each  chooses  between  the  two  products  at  a discrete  set  of 
points  in  time,  t  =  1,2,3....  The  aggregate  behavior  of  the 
population  at each point  in time  can be summarized  by a "state" 
variable  xt, giving  the  fraction  of  the  population  who  are  using 
technology  g.  Our model does not attempt  to explain the very first 
adoptions  of a new technology.  Rather,  we take the initial  state x0 
to be exogenous,  and focus  on the  social learning  reflected  in the 
subsequent  patterns  of the market share movements. 
The  specification  of  the  payoffs  provided  by  the  products 
incorporates  a  number  of  elements  which  complicate  decision- 
making  in  technology  adoption  problems.  We  assume  that  the 
payoff to consumer  i using  brand f at date t is ft +  Eift,  and that  i's 
payoff  to using brand  g at date t is gt  +  Eigt.  Here the Ei.t represent 
player-specific  idiosyncratic  shocks,  which  could  correspond  to 
variations  both  in the  quality  of individual  units  of the  product, 
and its suitability  for the consumer  in question.  (For example, they 
may  reflect  both  whether  a restaurant  meal  is  well  cooked,  and 
whether  the customer  ordered the right entree  given the way he is 
feeling  on a particular  day.) We suppose  that  the  Ei.t are i.i.d. both 
over time  and across  consumers,  which  implies  that  there  are no 
persistent  differences  between  individuals.2  For  computational 
2.  This involves a standard abuse of the law of large numbers. 98  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
convenience  we further  assume  that  each E has a normal distribu- 
tion with mean 0 and standard deviation  a. 
Common  shocks,  i.e.,  factors  affecting  the  relative  payoffs  of 
the  two  products  for all  consumers,  are  represented  by allowing 
ot  =--  -  ft to be random.  We assume that the Ot  are also i.i.d. and 
independent  of the  individual  specific  shocks,  and  that  the  mar- 
ginal distribution  over Ot  is binomial, with probabilityp,  0  < p  <  1, 
that  Ot =  0  >  0,  and  probability  1  -  p  that  Ot =  -0  <  0.3  The 
common  shocks  might  reflect the impact of weather  conditions  on 
two  agricultural  technologies,  the  different  effect  of  changing 
economic conditions  on firms who have chosen one of two business 
practices,  or variation  in the  quality  of the  designs  that  two firms 
produce in a given model year. 
Given the  distribution  of the  shocks,  the  probability that g is 
better  than  f  for  player  i  at  date  t  is p  Prob(Eigt  -  Eift  >  -0)  + 
(1 -  p) Prob(Eigt  -  Eift  >  0). 
Note  that  even  if p  =  1, so that  at each time  t brand g  has  a 
higher expected payoff, the probability that g does better than f for 
a given  individual  may be  less  that  one  due  to  the  idiosyncratic 
shocks. Note also that this formulation  places no restriction  on the 
distributions  of  the  mean  payoffs  ft  and  -,  but  only  on  their 
difference which  allows  for the  possibility  that  the  quality  of both 
products  is  increasing  over  time.  The  individual  means  will  not 
matter  until  we consider  an extension  of the  model in subsection 
VI.2. 
In choosing  between  the  two  alternatives,  the  agents  in  our 
model  are  assumed  to  follow  exogenously  specified,  boundedly 
rational  behavior  rules  that  incorporate  the  notions  that  there  is 
inertia  in consumer  choices,  and that  consumers  use the informa- 
tion  gathered  by word-of-mouth  communication  in a simple  way, 
without  the  explicit  considerations  of the  information  they  would 
see in each possible state of the world that is required in a Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. 
Inertia  is modeled with the assumption  that,  at each date t  > 
0, some  fraction  a,  0  <  a  <  1, of the  agents  decide to reevaluate 
their  choice.4 When agents  do reevaluate  their  choice,  they  ask N 
other  individuals  chosen  at random from the population  distribu- 
3.  The assumed  symmetry  between  payoffs in the  good and bad state  reduces 
the  number  of  cases  we  must  discuss  but  does  not  significantly  change  our 
qualitative  conclusions. 
4. A  more  realistic  model  would  specify  that  consumers  are  more  likely  to 
switch  if  they  are  dissatisfied  with  their  current  choice;  that  is,  if  their  current 
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tion  about  their  current  choice  and current  payoff. The  sampling 
agents  then  compute  the  average payoff of the  two alternatives  in 
their  sample,  and  choose  whichever  one  had  the  higher  average 
payoff. This extremely  simple decision rule ignores both the precise 
stochastic  structure  of the  payoffs,  and  the  implicit  information 
that may be conveyed by the relative popularity  of the two choices. 
Consequently,  it  may  be  more  plausible  in  complex  and  novel 
environments. 
Several  aspects  of this  rule  deserve  emphasis.  First,  a player 
who  is currently  using  one  choice  cannot  switch  to the  other  one 
unless  he talks to someone who is using it. As remarked above, this 
implies that the system  incorporates  a form of "popularity weight- 
ing,"  where  the  weight  is decreasing  in N.  Second,  players  weigh 
observations  of other players' experience  as heavily as they weight 
their  own.  Since  the  individual-specific  shocks  are assumed  to be 
i.i.d.,  this  behavior  is  consistent  with  the  model,  and  the  more 
plausible case where one's experience  is more relevant corresponds 
to a model with persistent  individual  shocks. Third, customers  use 
only current information  in making decisions.  The lack of informa- 
tion  on other  agents'  past  payoffs may be justified  by saying  that 
agents  simply  do  not  pay  attention  to  others'  casual  comments 
about  products  they  are not  considering  buying  at the  time.  The 
agents'  failure to incorporate their own past experience is harder to 
justify  fully, although  it is perhaps not unreasonable,  for example, 
for consumers  facing a choice between  computers  or other products 
for which  mean  quality  levels  change  so rapidly that  it is hard to 
compare the quality of products purchased  at different times.  To a 
degree, we use this extreme  assumption  simply to capture the idea 
that  boundedly  rational  consumers  will  not  fully  incorporate  all 
historical  information. 
Our analysis  of the  model  focuses  on the  dynamic  pattern  of 
the  market  shares  of  the  two  products  over  time.  Since  the 
aggregate  shock  Ot takes on only two values,  and we have supposed 
that  the  aggregate  distribution  of  idiosyncratic  shocks  over  the 
continuum  of  consumers  is  deterministic,  there  are  only  two 
possible values of x,+1 for each value of x.  For example, when N = 1, 
the evolution  of the system  is given by 
(1)  x1 
1(1  -  a)xt + ao[xt(xt  + (1 -  xt)q+) + (1 -  xt)xtq+]  with prob. p 
=(1-  a)xt + a[xt(xt + (1 -xt)q-)  + (1 -xt)xtq-  withprob.  1 -p, 100  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
where  q+  is the  probability  that  a randomly  drawn g-user  had  a 
higher payoff than  a randomly drawn f-user  when  Ot  =  0, and q -  is 
the analogous  term when  Ot  =  -0. 
To understand  the top line of this equation,  suppose that  Ot  = 
0. Recall first that  each period a fraction  (1 -  a) of the consumers 
do not consider switching.  Since a fraction xt of these  are currently 
using  g,  there  will  be  at  least  (1 -  a)xt  consumers  using  g  next 
period.  Of  the  a  consumers  who  do  consider  switching,  three 
subsets  choose  g  with  positive  probability.  Those  who  use g  and 
meet another g-user  choose g with probability one, while those who 
use g  and meet  an f-user  and those  who  use f and meet  a g-user 
both  choose g  with  probability q  +.  Multiplying  these  probabilities 
by  the  corresponding  masses,  which  are  oax', oaxt(l -  xt),  and 
oixt(l -  xt),  respectively,  yields  the  top  line  of  equation  (1);  the 
bottom line is the same with q -  replacing q +. 
For larger values  of N, the system  has the same general form, 
with xt+1  = H+ (xt)  when Ot  =  0+, and  xt+1  =  H-  (xt) when Ot  =  0-, but 
the  form  of  the  equations  H  becomes  more  complicated  in  two 
related  ways.  First,  the  binomial  distribution  for the  consumer's 
word-of-mouth  sampling is replaced by a multinomial  (Nxt)  distri- 
bution; e.g., the probability that k of N consumers  sampled use g is 
(  l)xt(1 -  xt)(N-k).  Second, for each value of k, there are different 
numbers  corresponding  to q + and q -,  namely  the probability that 
brand  g  has  a  higher  average  payoff  than  f  in  a  sample  of 
kg's  andN  -  k f's. 
Consequently,  the general form of the dynamics is 
(1  a)Xt  +  a(XtN+  +  z1k!(N  + 
- 
1k)!lXt  (-Xt)N-k 
\f  t/  +  1  N  +  +  -  -  A)/} 
X  1/k +  1I(N  +  1 -  k)))  with probability p 
Xteri =(1-  s  xth  +  sandaX+  +  cumulatki  dt  xti)Nfk 
X  D  r~/k+  1N+  1-  k)))  with probability  1-p 
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III.  LOCK-ON  AND HERDING:  A  LOCAL  ANALYSIS 
We have  not been  able to completely  determine  the  long-run 
dynamics of our model. Rather than simplify the model further, we 
have chosen to provide a partial characterization.  In particular, our 
results  concern  only  the  question  of  whether  the  system  will 
converge  to one of its  endpoints,  in which  case we will say that  it 
exhibits  "lock-on" or "herding,"  or whether  to the contrary there 
will be long-run diversity in the sense that both choices continue  to 
be used by nonnegligible  fractions  of the population. 
A great  practical  advantage  of this  sort of characterization  is 
that it only requires  a local analysis  of the system  in the neighbor- 
hood  of  its  endpoints.  In  this  section  we  temporarily  defer  any 
discussion  of  our  word-of-mouth  learning  model  to  present  a 
mathematical  result which greatly simplifies  such analyses.  Essen- 
tially,  the  lemma  shows  that  when  one  is  trying  to  determine 
whether  a member  of a class of Markov processes  can converge  to 
an extreme  point, one can work instead  with a linearized version of 
the system.  Given the complexity  of our model, the ability to work 
with a linear approximation  will be an advantage. 
LEMMA  1.  Letxt be a Markov process on (0,1) with 
H1  (xt)  with probability p 
Xt+i  =  1H2(xt) with probability  (1 -  p) 
Suppose that in a neighborhood  of 0, Hi(xt) =  yixt + o(xt), with 
Y2 <  1  <  Yi. 
(a)  If 
p  log  (Y2) 
1 - p  log (-Y1) 
then xt cannot converge to 0 with positive probability. 
(b)  If 
p  log  (Y2) 
<  -_ 
1i- p  log (-Y1)' 
then  there  are  strictly  positive  8  and  E  such  that 
Prob  [xt-->OIxo  ?!]2  E. 
(c)  If 
p  log  (Y2) 
>  -_ 
i  -  p  log (-Y1) 
there is anx*  >  O  such that for allx0 > 0, Prob [xt < x*  Vt lxo] = 0. 102  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Remark.  The  proof is deferred  to Appendix  A; the  following 
discussion  tries to provide an intuition.  Since this lemma concerns 
approximately  linear  systems,  the  best  way to understand  it is to 
first understand  the  case  of systems  that  are exactly  linear.  Such 
systems  are sufficient to make a crucial point: when the step size is 
proportional  to the  state,  as it is in the  models  of this  paper, the 
appropriate  notion  of  "negative  drift"  to  use  for  determining 
whether  the system  converges to zero is not the usual supermartin- 
gale condition  that  E(xt+1  Ixt) <  xt, but  rather  that  the  log of the 
system has negative  drift; that is, that E(log  (xt+1) Ixt) <  log (xt). In 
particular,  a system  with  positive  drift in the usual  sense  can still 
be  certain  to  converge  to  zero.  This  explains  the  role  of  the 
logarithms  in the various expression  in our theorems. 
To see why  this  is so, consider  the  case where x, is a Markov 
process  on  [0,)  and  the  functions  Hi are exactly  linear,  so that 
Hi(x)  =  yix. Let Zt  =  log (xt), and note that if xt --  0, then  Zt  oo. 
Moreover, the evolution  of zt is given by 
IZt +  log (y1) with probp 
Zt+il  Zt  +  log (Y2)  with  prob 1-  p 
so that  Zt is the  sum  of the  i.i.d.  increments  log (-yl) and log (Y2), 
with  probabilities p and 1 -  p,  respectively.  If p log (-yl) +  (1 -  p) 
log (Y2)  =  log (YP7Y2-P)  >  0, then by the strong law of large numbers 
Zt converges  to oo  with  probability  1, and hence  xt converges  to oo, 
which is the basis  of the proof of (a) and (c). If p log (-yl) +  (1 -  p) 
log (y2)  <  0, then  by the  strong  law Zt converges  to  -oo, and so xt 
converges to 0, which is the basis of the proof of (b). 
Once  the  analysis  of  the  linear  system  is  understood,  it 
remains  to explain  why the linear  approximation  methods  we use 
are valid. Basically,  if the log has negative  drift, then  not only does 
the  exactly  linear  system  converge  to  zero,  there  is  a  positive 
probability that it will converge without  ever moving to the right of 
its initial  position.  Along such paths the error in ignoring  terms  of 
higher  order  in  x  is  bounded,  and  we  can  conclude  that  the 
approximately linear system  converges  to zero as well. 
To conclude  this  section,  we return  to  our model  to give the 
linearized  form of its dynamics,  which is 
(2)  xt+  1 
J(1  -  ao  +  ac(N +  1)q+(N))xt  +  o(xt)  with prob.p 
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where 
q+(N)  =  4?  0(~+l  N  q  +  N)  = 
(10  +  1/N)1 
is the  probability  that  the  payoff to  a random  individual  using  g 
exceeds  the average payoff of N individuals  using f, conditional  on 
Ot =  0, and 
q-(N)  =  (1  / N  q 
0 ~r0(l  1+l  1/ N) 
denotes  the same probability conditional  on Ot =  -0. 
To understand  these  equations  intuitively,  note that  in period 
t  +  1  the  number  of g-users  will  consist  of  the  (1 -  a)xt  who 
previously  used g and did not consider switching,  plus a fraction of 
those who did consider switching.  When xt is near zero, the number 
of players  who  considered  switching  and  observed  both  choices  f 
and g is a(N  +  1)xt to first order in x. (This is the sum of almost  all 
of the g-users  who  consider  switching,  who  have  mass  oixt  plus  a 
share  Nxt  of  the  a(1  -  xt) f-users  who  consider  switching.)  The 
sample  of each of these  players  most  likely  consists  of one g-user 
and N f-users.  With such a sample, the probability that the average 
payoff to g is higher than the average payoff to f is q +  (N)  or q - (N) 
depending on the realization  of the common shock. 
Lemma  1  shows  that  this  approximation  can  be  used  to 
determine  the  behavior  in  the  neighborhood  of  zero.  Roughly 
speaking,  the true system  has positive  probability of converging  to 
zero  if  and  only  if  the  system  in  (2)  has  positive  probability  of 
converging  to zero. 
IV. CONFORMITY  VERSUS  DIVERSITY  WITH  Two  EQUALLY 
EFFICIENT  CHOICES 
This section  begins  our analysis  of word-of-mouth  learning by 
examining  the  special case in which p  =  1/2,  so that  the  payoffs to 
the two choices  have the  same distribution,  and hence  are equally 
efficient.5 Hence there is nothing  for the players to learn, although 
the players do not realize this.  By abstracting  from the forces that 
favor the adoption  of a superior product,  this  simple  model allows 
5.  Note  that  the  mean  payoffs  to  the  two  choices  still  fluctuate-the  two 
choices have the  same ex ante mean but one or the other can do better  ex post in a 
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us to highlight  the  effect  of learning  rules  in determining  when  a 
market  is likely  to be dominated  by a single  product,  practice,  or 
technology.  Also,  the  simplicity  of  this  case  makes  it  a  useful 
introduction  to the more general analysis  of the next section. 
Theorem  1 below  shows  that  the  system  exhibits  conformity 
when  players gather very little  information,  and exhibits  diversity 
when  the  word-of-mouth  communication  is  more  extensive.  To 
understand  the mechanism  behind this result,  it helps to note first 
that  when  each player talks  to exactly  one other player, there  will 
be equally many players using f who hear about g and using g who 
hear about f. Given the symmetry  of the payoffs, the popularity ofg 
will thus  move up or down in equal increments  depending  on the 
realization  of the common  shock. For example,  when g is unpopu- 
lar,  the  dynamics  might  dictate  that  g  will  either  decrease  in 
popularity  by 50 percent  or increase  in popularity  by 50 percent. 
Because  (1/2)(3/2)  =  3/4  <  1,  the system  has negative  "log drift" in the 
sense  explained  in  the  previous  section,  and  so  such  dynamics 
imply that unpopular  actions tend to die out. 
In contrast, when players obtain more word-of-mouth  informa- 
tion,  unpopular  technologies  tend  to  make  comebacks.  Suppose 
that  g  is  very  unpopular  and  the  sample  size  N  is  large.  While 
nearly all g-users  who consider  switching  in a given period will see 
an f-user,  the  size  of  this  group  will  still  be  small.  Because  the 
number  of f-users  is much larger, there  will be many more f-users 
who  hear  about g  than  vice versa.  Hence,  favorable  draws  of the 
common  shock  obtained  by g-users  will  cause  a large  number  of 
players  to  switch  to g,  while  unfavorable  draws  will cause  only a 
few  players  to  switch  away  from  g.  As  a  result,  unpopular 
technologies  will not die out, and the system  will exhibit  diversity. 
THEOREM 1.  Whenp  =  1/2, 
(a)  The state cannot converge to an endpoint  if 
-log  (1 + a((N  +  1)q- (N)  -  1)) 
log (1 + a((N  +  1)q+(N)  -  1)) 
(b)  The  state  converges  to  an endpoint  with  probability  1 if 
1 <  Q(a,N).  In this case the system  has positive probability of 
converging to either endpoint. 
(c)  There  is  a  unique  N*(a)  such  that  Q(a,N*(a))  =  1. 
Further, N * is increasing  in a, and N*(a)  >  iVa provided that 
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(d)  For N  < N*()  the system  exhibits  herding; i.e., the state 
converges  to an endpoint  with probability one. For N  >  N*(a) 
the  state  does  not  converge,  and  so  the  system  exhibits 
diversity. 
Proof.  For part (a), rewrite equation  (2) as 
(2't)  -  =IXt(1  +  a[(N  +  l)q+(N)  -  1])  with probabilityp 
)xt+l  lXt(1 +  al[(N+  1)q-(N)-  1])  withprobability1 -p. 
If (N +  1)q  - (N)  >  1, then  in the neighborhood  of 0 the  state 
increases  at each date regardless  of the realization  of 0. Clearly, the 
state cannot converge to zero in this case. If (N +  1)q - (N)  <  1 and 
Q(aN)  <  1,  applying  part  (a)  of  Lemma  1  yields  the  same 
conclusion.6 Symmetry  then implies that the state cannot converge 
to one. 
For part (b), suppose  that  1  <  Q(a,N)  and let A be the  (tail) 
event that xt does not converge to either  0 or 1, and suppose that A 
has positive  probability.  By Paul  Levy's zero-or-one  law (see, e.g., 
Chung [1974], p. 341), limt,,  prob (A  Ixt)  =  1A a.e., where 1A is the 
indicator  function  on A. Lemma  1(b) shows  that  there  is an E  >  0 
and anx'  >  0 such that Prob (AIxt <x'  orxt>  1 -x')  <  1 -  E. 
Hence if {xtj does not converge to an endpoint,  then  with probabil- 
ity one there must be a T such thatxt  E  (x',1  -  x') for all t >  T. But 
for all xt in this  interval,  the  state  can move to some xt  <  x'  in a 
finite  number  of  steps,  and  the  probability  that  this  occurs  is 
bounded away from zero. Thus, by theorem  9.5.2 of Chung, there is 
probability zero that the state remains in (x ',1 -  x') infinitely  often 
without  making  infinitely  many  transitions  to  the  region  [O,x'], 
and so the set A must be empty. 
For part (c), define Q*(ot,N) = (1 -  oa  + ot(N + 1)q+(N))(1 -  a  + 
oa(N +  1)q- (N))  =  (1  -  a)2  +  at(1  -  ao)(N +  1)  +  a2(N  + 
1)2q+(N)q-(N),  where  the  last  equality  follows  from  q+(N)  + 
q-(N)  =  1. Since Q* is obtained by multiplying  through  Q =  1 by 
its denominator  and then  exponentiating,  Q *(ot,N)  =  1 if and only 
if Q (ot,N) =  1. We first check that  for any a there  is at least  one N 
that  solves  Q*(a,N)  =  1.  This  follows  from  the  computations 
Q*(ot,1) =  1 -  (2aq+(1)  -  at)2 <  1  and limN,,  Q*(a,N)  =  oo,  and 
the observation  that Q* is a continuous  function. 
Appendix 2 shows that Q* =  1 implies  aQ*IN  >  0, and hence 
there is a unique N*((a) such that Q*(a,N*(a))  =  1. Appendix 2 also 
6.  Lemma  1 does not apply if (N +  1)q-(N)  >  1, as the  lemma  supposes  that 
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shows  that  aQ*(a,N*(a))Iaa  <  0  so  that  N*  is  an  increasing 
function.  Finally,  since Q*(a,1)  <  1, we have N*(a)  >  1 provided 
that 0 >  0. 
QED 
The  shape  of the  curve N *(a)  depends  on the  relative  size  of 
the aggregate  and idiosyncratic  shocks,  which we measure  by -9 = 
0/a.  When N is below  the  curve N* (a), the  system  converges  to a 
state  of conformity,  where  all  consumers  use  the  same  product. 
Intuitively,  the fewer other consumers  each consumer  samples, the 
less likely the consumer  is to observe and then adopt a product with 
a small market share, so that when N is small a product with a very 
small share will tend to be driven from the market.  If N lies above 
this  curve,  the  state  does  not  converge  (provided that  0 >  0),  so 
that the market shares are always changing,  and do not approach a 
state  where  one  product  captures  the  entire  market.  Figure  I 
displays the graph of N*(a)  for the case  q = 2. 
A particularly  strong form of diversity  obtains  when N is very 
large.  Let N  be the  solution  to N  =  l/q-(N)  -  1. (The  solution 
(0 
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exists  and is unique.7) If N  > N (which is about 40 when  N  =  2 and 
about 5 when  q =  1), then not only does the system  not converge to 
conformity,  it never  even  enters  a neighborhood  of a state  where 
everyone  uses  the  same  product.  This  is because,  when  N  is this 
large,  the  state  moves  toward  the  center  when  it  is  near  an 
endpoint,  even  if  the  common  shock  favors  the  more  prevalent 
choice. This occurs because the support of the idiosyncratic  noise is 
large enough  that,  even when the common  shock favors product g, 
some  users  of  product  f  will  receive  payoffs  that  exceed  that 
period's  mean  payoff to g,  and those  g-users  whose  only observa- 
tion  of f  is  favorable  will  switch,  so  each  f-user  who  receives  a 
favorable draw will cause Ng-users  to switch. 
As shown in Theorem  1, N * (a) is increasing  in a. The intuition 
for this  is that  the  system  is more likely to lock on when  it takes 
large jumps;  and  so  as  a  increases  larger N's  become  consistent 
with the system  locking on to a state of conformity. 
In  this  simple  case  of  equally  efficient  choices,  we  can  also 
determine  the  relationship  between  the  relative  sizes  of  the 
aggregate  and  idiosyncratic  shocks,  as  measured  by  aj, and  the 
tendency  for the  system  to exhibit  conformity  or diversity.  When 
there  are only  common  shocks,  (a  =  oo), we have  q+(N)  _  1 and 
q-(N)  0, so that N*((a) =  1/(1  -  a). When  q is very small, so the 
idiosyncratic  shocks  dominate,  q + and q -  are both  approximately 
1/2, and so N* (a) is slightly greater than  1 for all a. These two curves 
are graphed in Figure II, along with the previously  displayed curve 
for  9  =  2.  Note  that  the  long-run  behavior  of  the  system  is 
independent  of  r  when  a  is  small:  the  system  then  exhibits 
conformity  for N  =  1, and diversity for N  ?  2. 
The  conclusion  that,  with  substantial  inertia,  conformity 
obtains  only for the  extreme  case of N  =  1 might  seem to indicate 
that  conformity  is unlikely,  at least  absent  an efficiency  explana- 
tion.  Yet even  this  degree  of conformity  may be surprising,  given 
that  players  have  no  memory  and  always  gravitate  toward  the 
choice which  did better  in the  previous  period. Our interpretation 
of  this  result  is  that  the  combination  of  limited  word-of-mouth 
communication  and  our  implicit  "must-see-to-use"  assumption 
7.  It  is  suffiucient  to  show  that  (N  +  1)q-(N)  is  increasing  whenever 
(N +  1)q-(N)  =  1.  The  calculations  in  Appendix  2  show  that  (d/dN)(N  +  1) 
q  (N)  = q-(N)  -  u,(u)I2N.  Substituting  -1  +  l1q-(N)  for N, and using  u4(u)  < 
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generate  a tendency  toward  conformity  that  is not  present  when 
players sample more broadly. 
Appendix  2  shows  that  aQ*(a,N*(a))/ar  <  0,  so  as  the 
importance  of the common  shocks increases,  the system  converges 
to uniformity  for a larger set of parameter  values.  This  should  be 
fairly  intuitive:  because  both  choices  are  equally  good,  in  the 
absence of a common  shock there is no force that favors one choice 
over the  other.  Indeed,  in the  extreme  case  q =  0 where  common 
shocks  are absent,  the  system  is  deterministic,  and converges  to 
x  =  1/2  for any N  ?  2. (For N  =  1 the system becomes xt+i  = xt.) 
V.  PAYOFF-RELEVANT  CHOICES  AND  EFFICIENT  SOCIAL LEARNING 
We  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  diffusion  of  unequal 
technologies.  In contrast  to the  situations  studied  in the  previous 
section,  the long-run outcome  here may have substantial  efficiency 
consequences.  Technological  change  has  generally  been  regarded 
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that  models  of  learning  may  help  explain  why  the  diffusion  of 
innovations  has so often been found to be slow and incomplete.8 
We now refine conformity  into two subcategories:  we will say 
that  a population  exhibits  inefficient  herding  if  in  the  long  run 
everyone uses the inferior technology,  and that it exhibits  "efficient 
social  learning"  if  in  the  long  run  everyone  uses  the  superior 
choice. 
Formally,  we examine  here the general model of Section  II for 
the case ofp  >  1/2,  so that technology g is superior in the sense that 
it is better  more than  half of the  time.  For example,  this  superior 
technology  could take the  form of a new agricultural  practice that 
outperforms  the old one for a wide range of weather  conditions,  or 
a  new  management  practice  that  is  superior  for  a  large  set  of 
economic conditions. 
The  behavior  of  our  model  is  most  easily  understood  by 
thinking  of the  diffusion  process  as being  affected  by two  forces. 
First,  the  fact that g is better  more often  tends  to make g grow in 
popularity,  although  given  the  players'  inability  to  aggregate 
information,  this  force is of limited  strength.  Second, we have the 
tendency  of word-of-mouth  communication  to produce conformity 
or diversity  depending  on the number  of "friends"  that the agents 
contact.  As  we  will  see,  these  forces  can  combine  to  produce 
efficient  social  learning  despite  the  naive  behavior  we  have  as- 
sumed  at  the  individual  level.  This  occurs  when  the  tendency  of 
limited  word-of-mouth  communication  to  produce  conformity  is 
sufficiently  strong so that in combination  with the force of superior 
payoffs it allows g to dominate,  while at the same time the tendency 
for conformity  is too weak to allow inefficient  herding on f. 
Theorem  2 provides a complete  characterization  of the behav- 
ior of the model. In general,  all three behaviors  are possible.  As we 
will see later, however,  the model typically exhibits  diversity  when 
the word-of-mouth  communication  is extensive,  and efficient social 
learning when players receive less information. 
THEOREM  2.  Suppose thatp  >  1/2. 
(i)  If  [p/(1  -  p)]  <  Q(a,N),  the  system  exhibits  inefficient 
herding: the state converges to an endpoint with probabil- 
ity one, and converges to everyone using the inferior productf 
with positive probability  from all initial conditions. 
8.  See, e.g., Griliches [1957,  1994] and Mansfield  [1968] for empirical studies. 110  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
(ii)  If [(1 -  p)/p]  <  Q(a,N)  <  [p1(l  -  p)],  the system  exhib- 
its efficient social learning; i.e., it converges with probabil- 
ity one to the state where everyone  uses g. 
(iii)  If [(1 -  p)/p]  >  Q(a,N),  the system  exhibits  diversity,  as 
the state does not converge to either  endpoint.  Moreover, 
if  q ?  0, the system  does not converge to any determinis- 
tic limit; more precisely, Prob(3x  s.t. xt ->  x) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem  2. 
(i)  This  follows  Lemma  1 in  the  same  way  as  the  proof  of 
Theorem  1(a). (To analyze convergence to x = 1, make the 
change of variablesy  =  1 -  x.) 
(ii)  From Lemma  1(c), there is an x  >  0 such that Probi[xt < 
xVt Ixo] =  0 for all x0. From Lemma  1(b) there is an e>  0 
and a XE  <  1 such that Probl[xt ->  1 Ixo ?  XE]  ?  e.  More- 
over, for any x E  [xXE],  there is probability bounded away 
from zero that xt increases  in every period until it reaches 
a  state  greater  than  or equal  to xE, and  the  number  of 
steps  in  this  transition  is  finite.  Hence  whenever  the 
system  is below  xE,  it  has  positive  probability  of passing 
above  it; and  each  time  it  does  so,  it  has  probability  at 
least  E of converging  to  1. Hence  from Theorem  9.5.4  of 
Chung [1974], the system  converges to 1 almost surely. 
(iii)  From  Lemma  1(c)  the  system  cannot  converge  to  any 
point below some x  >  0 or to any point above some x- <  1, 
and  the  system  has  steps  that  are bounded  away  from 
zero in the interval  [xil. 
QED 
Theorem  2 shows that,  as in the previous section, the long-run 
behavior of the system  for a fixed level of q is summarized  by size of 
Q(a,N).  Figure  III displays  numerical  plots of the curves N and N 
defined by 
Q(aN(a))  =  (1 -  p)/p 
Q(aN(a))  =  p/(1  -  p) 
for the parameter values p  = 0.6 and r  = 2. We have not been able 
to prove that N and N must be curves in general, but this  seems  to 
be the case in our numerical  computations.9 
9.  The results  of the last section  and a continuity  argument  show that N must 
be a curve forp's  sufficiently  near to 1/2. WORD-OF-MOUTH  COMMUNICATION  111 
/ 
/ 
to  / 
/ 
-/a) 
0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
a 
FIGURE  III 
Looking  at Figure  III, in the  top region  where N  >  N(a)  the 
system  exhibits  diversity,  as before.  In the  bottom  region,  where 
N  < N(a),  the system  exhibits  conformity  or "two-sided herding," 
with  the  state  eventually  converging  to one of the  endpoints,  and 
both  endpoints  having  positive  probability  of being  selected.  This 
behavior  is much  like the  conformity  case of the  previous  section; 
the  one new  feature  is that  the  state  can converge  to the  inferior 
choice.  However,  unlike  in  the  previous  section,  this  two-sided 
herding  cannot  occur for very small values  of a as now N  <  N(a) 
may require that N  <  1: when f, say, is an inferior choice, there is a 
smaller set of parameter values where the state can converge to f. 
The most novel aspect of Figure III is the intermediate  region 
where  N(a)  <  N  <  N(a).  Here  the  system  exhibits  a  form  of 
efficient  social  learning,  in  the  sense  that  all  of  the  agents 
eventually  adopt and stick with  the  superior  product.  Intuitively, 
because players using a word-of-mouth  decision rule are unlikely to 
switch  to an unpopular  product  (at least  if N is not too large), the 
state  has  a tendency  to  be  absorbed  by an  endpoint  whenever  a 
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between  the  products  provides  an  additional  force  favoring  the 
superior  choice,  which  increases  the  probability  of converging  to 
the  superior choice, and can reduce or eliminate  the probability of 
converging to the opposite, inferior, extreme. 
Figure  IV illustrates  the  way  the  three  regions  change  as p 
increases  from 0.55 to 0.70, again with  q = 2. As seen in the figure, 
increasing  p  increases  p/(1  -  p),  which  shifts  the  curve N  down, 
and decreases  (1 -  p)/p,  which  shifts  the  curve N  up.  Thus,  the 
"efficient  learning  region"  N(a)  <  N  <  N(a)  where  the  state 
converges  to the better  choice increases,  and the two other regions 
both shrink. 
Three  properties  of  the  efficient  learning  region  are  worth 
noting.  First,  the  curve  N*(a)  of  the  previous  section  (which 
corresponds  to p  =  1/2)  lies within  the  efficient  learning  region  for 
any p  >  1/2,  and indeed N  = N*(a)  is the  unique  value  of N which 
leads  to  the  efficient  choice  for all values  of p.  We will  therefore 
refer to sampling N* (a) people as the uniformly  optimal rule. 
Second, N(a)  is less that  1 when a is not too large, where  "too 
large" is 0.2 forp  = 0.55 and increases  inp.  Since N(a)  > N*(a)  > 
1, N  =  1 leads to efficient learning  for a wide range of a's provided 
that the two choices are not too similar.10 
Third,  Q  (a,N)  <  (1 -  p)/p  for  all N  >  N,  where  N  is  the 
number  defined  in the  last  section  such  that  N  >  N  implies  the 
state  moves  toward  the  center  with  probability  one  when  it  is 
sufficiently  near the endpoints.  Hence, the curve provides an upper 
bound  on the  efficient  learning  region  which  is independent  of p. 
When N exceeds this level, the forces that prevent convergence  are 
strong  enough  to prevent  efficient  learning  even if one technology 
is always better than the other; i.e., if its mean payoff is better with 
probability one.11 
The long-run dynamics of this model are fairly similar to those 
in the  model  with  explicit  popularity  weighting  we  considered  in 
our  earlier  paper  [Ellison  and  Fudenberg  1993],  where  players 
were assumed to be less willing to switch to an unpopular choice. In 
that  model,  as  in  this  one,  there  are three  regions  of parameter 
space. With very little  popularity  weighting,  the  system  oscillates, 
10.  More  formally,  Q(a,1)  is  continuous  in  a,  and  limb-o Q(ao,1) =  1, so for 
sufficiently  small a  we have Q(a,1)  E ((1  -  p)Ip,p/(l  -  p), andN  =  1 yields efficient 
social learning.  Here "sufficiently  small"  is about 0.5(!) forp  =  0.65,  and about 0.2 
forp  = 0.55; asp  approaches 0.5 the required a's shrink to 0. 
11.  But note  that N depends  on the  magnitude  0 of the payoff difference: as 0 
increases,  the probability q-  decreases. WORD-OF-MOUTH  COMMUNICATION  113 
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just as it does here when N is large. (Indeed, in the limit as N and  q 
go  to  infinity,  the  word-of-mouth  model  converges  to  the  zero- 
popularity-weighting  case of the previous paper.) With very substan- 
tial  popularity  weighting,  the  system  always  converges,  but  can 
converge to the wrong choice, which corresponds to small N here.12 
Finally,  for an intermediate  amount  of popularity  weighting,  the 
state  always  converges  to the  better  choice.  Unlike  with  word-of- 
mouth  decisions,  though,  there  is a single  value  of the  popularity 
weighting  that ensures  the long-run  outcome is efficient. 
VI.  MORE COMPLEX  DECISION  RULES 
To test  the  robustness  of our qualitative  conclusions,  we now 
consider two more complex variants  of the word-of-mouth  decision 
rule. 
1. Popularity  Weighting 
The  first  variant  we  consider  supposes  that  players  use 
popularity  weighting  of  the  kind  we  considered  in  Ellison  and 
Fudenberg  [1993]: players who observe the average payoffs  tg  and 
4tf  chose  g  if Ot -  V  >  m(1  -  2xt). Note  that  this  rule  supposes 
that  agents  observe  the  aggregate  popularity  xt  in  the  entire 
population,  but learn the payoffs of the agents they talk to directly. 
This seems  plausible  to us, as popularity  is easier to communicate 
than  a level  of satisfaction,  and  also  may be  well  proxied  by the 
consumer's  observations  of, e.g., the  relative  numbers  of different 
brands of cars on the road to work. 
Intuitively,  popularity weighting  increases  the forces favoring 
convergence  to  an  endpoint,  and  so  should  increase  the  set  of 
parameters  for which convergence  occurs. Thus, beginning  from a 
situation  of no popularity weighting,  i.e., m = 0, a small increase in 
m, holding N constant,  should increase the efficiency of the system 
if  (a,N)  lies  just  above  the  curve  N  that  determines  the  upper 
boundary of the optimal learning  region, and an increase in m with 
N  constant  should  decrease  the  long-run  efficiency  of the  system 
starting  at  a  point  (a,N)  that  lies  just  above  the  curve  N  that 
determines  the  lower  boundary  of  the  optimal  learning  region. 
Moreover,  a nonnegligible  amount  of popularity  weighting  could 
shift  the  curve N  up enough  so that  it lies  above the  point  (0,1), 
reversing  our conclusion  that N  =  1 is optimal when  the inertia  is 
12.  But, unlike the previous paper, this case may not arise if a is small. WORD-OF-MOUTH  COMMUNICATION  115 
high.  Consequently,  when  players  use  popularity  weights,  larger 
sample sizes may be optimal. 
All  of  these  intuitions  turn  out  to  be  correct.  To  state  the 
conclusions  formally, let 
0 -  m  \  -0  -  m\ 
q+(Nm)  = (?  F1 ~+l 
O 
N-  and  q (N,M)  =  (- 
U 
O m+  1/N) 
be the analogs of q+ and q- when players use popularity weighting, 
let 
-log  (1  + 
&((N 
+  1)q-(N,m)  -  1)) 
log (1  +  o&((N  +  1)q+(N,m)  -  1)) 
and let N*  (om)  be the  solution  to  Q(a,N,m)  =  1. (Calculations 
similar  to  those  of Section  IV show  that  a solution  exists  and is 
unique.) As in Section V, N  = N*(a,m)  is the one sampling rule that 
guarantees  efficient social learning uniformly  over all values ofp. 
THEOREM  3.  Suppose thatp  >  1/2. 
(i)  If  [p1(1  -  p)]  <  Q(a,N,m),  the  state  converges  to  an 
endpoint  with  probability  one,  and  exhibits  inefficient 
herding,  as the state  converges  to the inferior choice with 
positive  probability  from  initial  conditions  sufficiently 
close to 0. If m is large enough, this inefficient herding can 
occur with probability one for some initial conditions. 
(ii)  If [(1 -  p)/p]  <  Q(a,N,m) <  [p/(1  -  p)], there is efficient 
social learning: the system  converges with probability one 
to the state where everyone uses g. 
(iii)  If [(1 -  p)/p]  >  Q(a,N,m), the  system  does not converge 
to either endpoint. Moreover, if  ?  # 0, the system does not 
converge  to  any  deterministic  limit;  more  precisely, 
Prob(3x  s.t. xt  -> x) = 0. 
(iv)  Q(oa,N,m) is  increasing  in  m  wherever  it  is  defined  and 
nonnegative,  so that  a small increase  in m, holding  other 
parameters  constant,  either  causes  a  change  from  case 
(iii) to case (ii) or a change from case (ii) to case (i), or has 
no effect on which  of the  three  cases  prevails.  Moreover, 
the  uniformly  optimal  sampling  rule N*(a,m)  is increas- 
ing in m. 
Since the analysis  closely follows that of the previous  sections, 
we omit the proof. Figure V graphs N and N from m = 0 and m = 0, 
with  (o =  0.50 and p  =  0.6.  (Thus,  the  case m  =  0 repeats  Figure 116  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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III.)  Note  that  with  popularity  weighting  in  this  example,  the 
optimal  sample  size N  is about  three.  The  one qualitative  change 
caused by popularity  weights  is that  for small N and large enough 
m the system  is certain to lock on to the nearest  endpoint whenever 
it starts out sufficiently  close to it. 
2. Infrequent  Sampling and Social Memory 
In  the  models  we  have  considered  so  far,  word-of-mouth 
sampling generated  information  on the performance  of the various 
choices  in  the  previous  period.  These  models  thus  implicitly 
supposed  that  the N players each agent  sampled have all observed 
the  payoffs  in  the  previous  period,  presumably  because  they 
themselves  had used the products  then.  As a further  check on the 
robustness  of our conclusions,  we now consider  a model in which 
individuals  observe the payoffs less frequently,  so that the individu- 
als in an agent's  sample may report observations  from a number of 
different  past  periods,  and  the  sampling  process  incorporates  a 
form of "social memory"  that  can reduce the effect of the common 
shocks.  This  social  memory  might  be  expected  to  give  a clearer 
advantage to the product that is better on average, as it reduces the 
probability  that  unrepresentative  draws  push  the  system  in  the 
wrong  direction.  Social  memory  might  also  be  expected  to  make 
larger sample sizes more efficient than in the model without  social 
memory,  where  large  sample  sizes  preclude  fully  efficient  social 
learning.  Without  social  memory  a  large  sample  can  still  be 
misleading  due to an unrepresentative  value of the common shock, 
but a large sample  with  a large social memory  should  lead almost 
all of the agents  to choose the better  action. As we will see, both of 
these  intuitions  are essentially  correct. 
Allowing  for  social  memory  requires  players  to  compare 
payoffs to fin  one period with those tog  in another.  For this reason, 
we find it easiest  to specialize the distribution  of payoffs so that the 
common shock affects the payoffs to f andg  symmetrically.  That is, 
we suppose that g  = Ot/2, ft =  Ot/2. 
We begin  with  the  case  of  a two-period  social  memory.  For 
simplicity,  we  assume  that  a  fraction  a  of  the  players  consider 
switching  every other period. This leads to a Markov process  with 
three  realizations  for the common  shocks,  0, 1, and 2, correspond- 
ing to the number of times the common shock took on the value 0 in 
the  previous  two periods.  In a neighborhood  of x  =  0, the  system 118  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
then evolves according to 
FXt(1  -  a  +  a(N + 1)q+(N))  + o(xt)  withprobabilityp2 
Xt+=  Xt(1  -  at  + a(N + 1)/2) + o(xt) withprobability2p(1 -p) 
Xt(1 -  ot  + ot(N  +  1)q-(N))  + o(xt)  with probability (1  _  p)2. 
In this  system  the  transitions  for realization  0 and 2 are the 
same  as  those  for the  realizations  -0  and  0, respectively,  in the 
original model. In realization  1, players who see both actions played 
are equally likely to think that either is better. 
This  system  takes  on a particularly  simple  form if N  =  1, for 
then  in realization  1 the  system  does not move.  (To see why, note 
that  there  are just  as  many  f-players  who  observe  g-players  as 
g-players  who  observe  f-players,  and  that  in  realization  1,  the 
probability that  one draw of g beats  one draw of f is 1/2.)  The same 
arguments  as  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  2  show  that  there  is 
efficient social learning with p  >  1/2 if 
p2/(l  -  p)2  >  Q(aL,1) >  (1  -  p)2/p2, 
which  is the  previous  condition  with p2 replacingp,  and  (1  -  p)2 
replacing  (1 -  p).  Since this  is a weaker  condition,  N  =  1 will still 
yield efficient social learning provided that a is not too large. 
With  larger  sample  sizes,  the  behavior  of the  model  is more 
complicated,  because  it is no longer  true  that  the  system  remains 
constant  (xt+l = xt) following  the  realization  of one  draw of each 
value of the shock. For instance,  with very large samples, almost all 
players  will  have  both  f-users  and g-users  in  their  samples,  and 
since in realization  1 the payoffs off  and g are drawn from the same 
distribution,  half of these players will adopt each technology.13  This 
provides  an additional  force favoring  diversity,  instead  of the  null 
transition  that  occurs in state  1 when N  =  1. For this  reason,  it is 
no  longer  necessarily  true  that  efficient  learning  occurs  for  any 
parameter values that yield efficient learning with one-period social 
memory,  and  indeed  we  have  found  examples  where  increasing 
social  memory  from  1 to  2,  holding  other  parameters  constant, 
causes  long-run  behavior  to  switch  from  efficient  learning  to 
diversity.  However,  increasing  the  social  memory  cannot  allow 
inefficient herding to occur when it would not occur previously.14 
13.  Remember  that  the distribution  of the idiosyncratic  shocks  is normal  and 
so is symmetric. 
14.  For  the  special  case  of two-period  social  memory,  we can  show  that  the 
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Now  we  turn  to  the  limit  case  of an infinite  social  memory, 
which we model by supposing that the distribution  of experience  in 
the  population  is  deterministic,  with  a fraction  p  of the  g-users 
having  experience  based 0+ and fraction  (1 -  p) having experience 
based  on  0.  Hence  the  aggregate  system  is deterministic  and its 
evolution  is given by 
(3)  xt+=  (1 -  ao)xt  + ao  Prob(g  > fjN,xt), 
where the probability term in (3) is the probability that the average 
realized  payoff to g  exceeds  the  average  realized  payoff to f  in  a 
sample  of N  +  1 players  drawn from a population  where xt of the 
players use g. (If no players in the sample use g, g's average realized 
payoff in the sample is minus  infinity.) 
In a neighborhood  of x =  0, equation  (3) can be approximated 
by 
Xt+=  Xt [1  -  ao  + ao(N  + 1)(pq  +  (N) + (1 - p)q - (N))] + o(xt), 
where  c +  (N)  is  the  probability  that  a  single  draw  from  the 
favorable distribution  of g exceeds the average of N draws from the 
distribution  of f. 
Thus,  the  state  converges  to  0 if p  +(N)  +  (1 -  p)q-(N)  < 
1/(1  + N),  and  the  state  cannot  converge  to  zero  if  the  reverse 
inequality  holds. Ifp  <  1/2,  this inequality  is satisfied  for N  =  1. To 
see this, note that 
I0\ 
pq+(l)  +  (1 -p)q-(l)  =p2(,)+  2p(l  -p)- 
+  (1  -P)2(1  -  (  ) 
This expression  will be less than  1/2  if the (weighted)  average of the 
first  and  third  term  is  less  than  1/2. Because  p2  <  (1  - 
p)29 
FD(0/ov2)  >  1/2,  and the  fact that  the  unweighted  average  of these 
two  terms  is  1/2, this  is true.  Hence  under  infinite  social  memory 
N  =  1 yields  efficiency  for any  value  of the  inertia  parameter  a, 
while  N  =  1 and  large  a  can  lead  to  inefficient  herding  without 
social  memory.  Intuitively,  the  social  memory  averages  out  the 
unrepresentative  draws  that  can  otherwise  lead  to  inefficient 
herding when ao  is large. 
some parameters  that previously corresponded to inefficient herding lead to efficient 
learning,  and  some  parameters  that  corresponded  to  efficient  learning  lead  to 
diversity.  The calculations  are available on request. 120  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
There is still diversity as N grows, since q + is at least  1/2,  and so 
the inequality  above cannot be satisfied for any N  >  -  1 + 2/p.  We 
should note, though,  that this observation  may say more about the 
inclusiveness  of our  notion  of diversity  than  about  the  long-run 
behavior of the system. When N is large andp  <  1/2,  the system does 
not converge to zero, but its steady state  is very near to this  point. 
The  intuition  for this  is  simple.  If players  receive  large  samples 
from  the  population  distribution,  and  that  distribution  corre- 
sponds to the long-run  distribution  of 0, then  most players  should 
receive  representative  samples  and  hence  make  the  payoff- 
maximizing  choice. Thus, while large samples  continue  to preclude 
exact efficiency, the efficiency cost of large samples  is low when the 
social memory is large. 
(More  formally,  suppose  that  p  <  1/2, and  that  there  is  a 
sequence  of steady states x * that remains bounded away from zero 
as N goes to infinity.  Then for any E>  0,  there is an N'  such that if 
the sample size N is greater than N'  and the system  is at the steady 
state  xN,  at  least  (1  -  e)  of  the  players  will  have  samples  that 
contain  many draws of both f and g,  and, moreover,  have average 
payoffs in the  sample for each technology  that  are within  (2p -  1) 
0/3  of their  theoretical  average payoffs.  Hence,  at least  (1  -  e)  of 
the  players  will choose  the better  technology,  and so x*  can be at 
most  E,  which  contradicts  the  hypothesis  that  the  steady  states 
were bounded away from 0.) 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  studied  a  simple  model  of  word-of-mouth 
communication.  We find that,  despite the naive play of individuals, 
this  type of information  flow may lead to efficient  learning  on the 
social  level,  and that  social  learning  is  often  most  efficient  when 
communication  between  agents  is fairly limited.  When the choices 
are equally good on average, so that efficiency is not an issue, either 
herding or diversity  can occur, with herding more likely with small 
sample sizes. These qualitative  conclusions  are largely independent 
of  the  composition  of  the  noise,  and  are  fairly  robust  to  some 
obvious changes in the specification  of the model although  popular- 
ity weighting  can make larger sample sizes optimal. 
In  addition  to  our  specific  conclusions,  we  hope  that  our 
analysis demonstrates  that boundedly rational learning models are 
an  interesting  and  tractable  way  to  understand  some  aspects  of 
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APPENDIX  1 
LEMMA  1.  Letxt  be a Markov  process  on  (0,1)  with 
fHi(xt)  with  probability  p 
t+i  1H2(xt)  with  probability  (1  -  p)J 
Suppose  that  Hi(xt)  =  yixt + o(xt),  with  Y2 <  1  < y. 
(a) If 
p  log (Y2) 
i-p  log('y1) 
then  xt cannot  converge  to  0 with  positive  probability. 
(b) If 
p  log (Y2) 
i  -  p  log  (y1)' 
then  there  are  strictly  positive  8  and  E  such  that 
Prob[xt--Ojxo  <?]  ?  E. 
(c) If 
p  -log  (Y2) 
i-  p  log  (y1) 
there  is ax*  >  O  such  that  for allx0  >  0, Prob  [xt <  x*Vtxo]  = 
0. 
Proof  of Lemma  1.  (a)  for  any  E such  that  0  <  E  <  Y2, define 
Hi (x)  =  yix -  Ex, and choose  8  >  0 such that,  for i =  1, 2, Hi (x)  < 
Hi(x)  whenever  x  <  8.  If  for  some  initial  condition  x0  there  is 
positive  probability  that  xt  ->  0,  then  from  the  same  initial 
condition  there  is a T such  that  there  is positive  probability  that  of 
the  event  {xt ->  0 and  xt  <  8  for  all  t  2  T}.  For  each  realization  of 
the  process  {xt}, let  i(t)  =  1 if xt  =  Hl(xt-1),  and  let  i(t)  =  2 if xt  = 
H2(xt-1). 
Define  a new  stochastic  process  {jy} on  (O,oo)  by 
Yt = Xt  for  all  t  <  T 
At=H~t  -:  1  )  for  all  t  >  T. 
We  claim  that  since  the  event  {xt ->  0 and  xt  <  8 for  all  t  2  T} 
has  positive  probability,  then  so  does  the  event  yt ->  0.  To  see  this, 
note  that  on  this  event,  YT <  8  and  YT <  XT. Suppose  that  for  all  t 122  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
from T to T +  sYT+s  <  8 andyT+s  <  XT+s.  Then 
YT+s+1  =  Hi(T+S+1)(YT+S)  <  H(T+S+1(XT+s) 
<  Hi(T+s+l)(XT+s)  =  XT+s+l  <68 
and so by induction  the first event implies the second one. 
Next,  if yt  -*  0, then  the process  zt defined by zt =  log yt must 
converge to  -oo. Moreover, we have ZT+s  =  YT  +  Is=  UT where the 
UT  are  i.i.d.  binomial  random  variables,  taking  on  the  values 
log(y1 -  E)  and  log  (Y2  -  E)  with  probabilities p  and  (1 -p), 
respectively. 
Thus,  the  strong  law  of  large  numbers  implies  that  the 
conditional  probability  that zt converges  to - o must be 0 if E(UT) > 
0; i.e., ifp  log (-y1  -  E) +  (1  -  p) log (Y2  -  E)  >  0. If, as hypothesized 
in part (a) of the lemma,  [p/(1  -  p)]  >  [log (-y2)/log (,y)],  then this 
inequality  holds true for all sufficiently  small  E, which proves part 
(a). 
The  argument  for part  (c) of the  Lemma  is nearly  identical. 
Again, letEbe  such thatp  log (y1 -  E) +  (1 - p) log  (Y2  -  E)  >  O  and 
choose  8 so that  Hi6(x) <  Hi(x) whenever  x  <  6. Let x*  =  8, and 
define It}I as above with T = 0. If xt < x *Vt, thenyt  < x*Vt as well. 
Because  {yAj  converges  to infinity  with  probability  one, this  event 
has probability zero. 
(b) Suppose that 
p  log (Y2) 
1 -p  log (y1) 
and choose  E such that 
p  log (Y2  +  E) 
i  -  <p  log('y  +  E) 
Let Hif(x)  =  y x + Ex,  and choose 8 >  0 such that, for i =  1,2, 
HiE(x)  >  Hi(x) for x  < 6. Define a new stochastic  process by {yt} on 
(0,)  by 
Yo =  X0 
Yt = Hi'(tr)(yt-1)  for all t  >  1. 
By  the  strong  law,  yt  converges  to  0  with  probability  1. 
Moreover,  if x0  <  8, there  is  a positive  probability  of  the  event 
{yt ->  0 and yt  <  8 Vtt}.  An induction  like the  one in part (a) shows WORD-OF-MOUTH  COMMUNICATION  123 
that  this  event  implies  that  Xt  converges  to  0  as  well,  which 
completes  the proof of part (b). 
APPENDIX  2:  SIGNING  THE  PARTIAL  DERIVATIVES OF Q* 
(i) Proof that  (dQ*/dN)(a,N*(a))  >  0. Recall (from the  proof 
of Theorem 1) that  Q*(oN)  =  (1  -  at)2  +  oa(l -  oa)(N  +  1)  + 
at2(N +  1)2q  +  (N)q - (N).  Taking the partial derivative yields 
dQ* 
(Al)  dQ = a(l  -  a) +  at22(N +  1)q+(N)q-(N)  aN 
+  o2(N  +  1)2q+(N)  aq(N)  + oa2(N  +  1)2q-(N)  aNM. 
Using the change of variables 
0 
U  l  +  1/N 
we have 
a  a  uC(u) 
aN  aN  2N(N+  1) 
and 
d  u4(u) 
aNyq(N)  =  2N(N  +  1)' 
where 4, the normal density, is the derivative of the normal c.d.f. 
F. Substituting into (Al) shows that it is sufficient  to verify 
(A2)  1 -  a + 2a(N  +  14(u)4(-u) 
N+  1 
>  a  2N  u4(u)(t(U)  -  (-U)) 
when N = N*(a). 
Solving the quadratic  equation that defines  N*, we find that 
-0a(l  -  a)  +  Va2(1  -  a)2 + 4a3(2 -  a)(u4(-u) 
N*(a^)  +  1 =  2a^24?(u)4( -  u) 
Substituting into (A2) then yields 
-  a)2  + 4a(2  -  a)(uW(-u) 
N*(ao) +  1 
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Using  ao <  1, 2  -  ot >  1, (1 -  oa)2 >  0,  (N +  1)/2N  <  1, ?D(u) > 
(?(u)  -  ID(-u))2,  and 4+(u)  = 4)(-u),  it suffices that 
(A3)  [U2 4(U)2/t(U)]  <  4. 
For u  >  -2,  the  left-hand  side  is  at  most  (u4(u))2/?(-2). 
Using  4)' =  -u4),  the  numerator  of this  last  expression  is  maxi- 
mized  at u  =  1, so that  the  value  of the  left-hand  side of (A3) is 
bounded by (21TeF(-2))-1,  which is less than 4. 
For  u  <  -2  we  use  the  fact  that  ?(u)  >  4(U)I(u2  -  1)/u31 
(see,  e.g.,  Ross  [1984],  p.  161).  Thus,  [u24.(u)2/F(u)]  <  V3U34.(U). 
The  maximum  on  the  interval  u  <  -2  occurs  at  -2,  where  the 
left-hand  side of (A3) is 32e-2/3V2m, which again is less than 4. 
The other partial derivatives  are easier to sign. 
Writing 
Q*(ot,N) =  1 + ot[(N -  1) + ot((N +  1)q+(N)  -  1)((N + 1)q-(N)  -  1)], 
we have 
Q*  (0t,N*(ot)) = ot[((N +  1)q+(N)  -  1)((N  +  1)q -(N)  -  1)]  dat 
+  (Q*(ot,N*(o))  -  u)/a 
= Ot[I(N  +  1)q+(N)  -  1)((N  +  1)q-(N)  -  1)] 
=  1 -  N*(a)  <  0, 
where the first equality  comes directly from Q*(agN*(a))  =  1, and 
the  second  uses  that  fact and the  equation  for Q*. Note  that  the 
inequality  is strict for all 0 >  0. Finally, 
aQ*  a  -  (otN*(ot))  =  at2(N +  1)2  -  (q +  (N)q -(N)); 
this is negative  for 0 >  0 because  q+(N)  >  1/2, q+(N)  =  1 -  q-(N), 
and aq+(N)/ a-  >  0. 
QED 
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